“Clausewitz and People’s War”

Harsh Thakor

Carl von Clausewitz is one of the most innovative military thinkers of all time. His analysis transcends the domain of specific historical experiences and elevates military theory to a high plane of generalization. Exploring the relationship between war and politics–the mutual relationships between the military command, the civil government, and the people, as well as the phenomena that determined the escalation of violence, Clausewitz amassed a substantial and original body of work, which gained increasing recognition from the end of the 19th century. But it was not within the ranks of the military command that Clausewitz’s thinking had the greatest impact. Instead, his closest readers were discovered among the theoreticians and practitioners of people’s and revolutionary war. While Clausewitz’s influence on Lenin was highlighted, the influence of his ideas on Engels, Mao, Giáp, and others has remained relatively unknown. The first French edition of “Clausewitz and the People’s War” showcased this influence and transcended the history of ideas, to tackle aspects of revolutionary warfare from unexplored perspectives, and creatively engage in current and historical military debates.

Two decades after it was first published by Aden, and after a year’s work in close collaboration with the author, Foreign Languages Press is pleased to present the new, final edition of Clausewitz and the People’s War and Other Politico-Military Essays.

The republication of Clausewitz and the People’s War will usher a new phase of debate on the revolutionary military question. Dedicated chapters on Giáp and Mao were grossly lacking, and the recent publication of important sources, such as General Giáp’s Memoirs or Mao Zedong’s reading notes, which have since become viable, have compensated this gap.

T Derbent’s work capitalises on a long tradition of integrating Clausewitz’s theories into Marxism in general and Marxism-Leninism in particular. Several decades of research has established him as one of the leading experts on the military question in its relation to historical and contemporary revolutionary movements. His work (books, articles, conferences) addresses both the historical aspect of this incorporation, with a study of the influence of Clausewitz’s writings on Marxist theorists and leaders (Jaurès, Mehring, etc)–as well as on the theoretical aspect of this assimilation–both in terms of the profound bondage between these thoughts (their dialectical character, their articulation of the relationship between war and politics)and in terms of the direct influence of Clausewitz’s theses on the Marxist-Leninist literature.

The book dissects the correlation between Clauzwit’s ideas and military theories of leaders like Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao and Che Guevara., tracing the origins of their military concepts to ideas of Clausewitz, even if not directly attributing.

The main role of Clausewitz and the People’s War is, its side-by-side presentation of the great revolutionary military-political legacy that has, in one way or another, practised people’s war. It is built around and through a complex history whose internal tensions the author boldly projected. The narration of those traditions makes it possible, perhaps for the first time, for the informed reader to evaluate the different military strategies of the revolutionary movement on a scientific basis.

The republication of’ Clausewitz and the People’s War’ will usher a new phase of debate on the revolutionary military question. Dedicated chapters on Giáp and Mao were grossly lacking, and the recent publication of important sources, such as General Giáp’s Memoirs or Mao Zedong’s reading notes, which have since become viable, have compensated this gap.

Derbent notes how Engels was the first ‘attentive reader of Clausewitz’ in the revolutionary tradition, and showcases how much of his ground-breaking work on military strategy was influenced by this reading. Secondly, Derbent discusses methods in which Franz Mehring, who was instrumental in unfurling Engels’ work on military strategy out of the wilderness, was also a disciple of Clausewitz, recognising him ‘as a genius theoretician’ while also ‘exposing his limitations. Thirdly, Derbent investigates Lenin’s comprehensive study of Clausewitz’s On War, and diagnoses it as the first concrete analysis of military strategy from a Marxist perspective. That is, correctly understanding the meaning of Clausewitz’s famous maxim, ‘Lenin added a new dimension: by examining the political nature of war–in the final analysis, its class character–we can understand its historical and moral character, and thus distinguish between just and unjust wars.’ Indeed, Lenin’s interpretation and implementation of Clausewitz was developed according to the concrete aim of making revolution and, commanding the ways the Red Army would defend the revolution in 1918.

Trotsky, who did not think there could be an axiomatic approach to warfare, dismisses Clausewitz, rejecting the possibility of a specifically proletarian methodology of war that Lenin was indicating in his studies. Most baffling however, was Stalin’s ‘gross misrepresentation’ of Clausewitz directly following World War II, associating his theory with the military strategy of the Nazis.

Mao Zedong’s theorisation of protracted people’s war would serve, according to Derbent, as the most accurate and complete conception of military strategy from the revolutionary camp, and it was largely influenced by Mao’s reading of Clausewitz alongside Sun Tzu. Moreover, Mao’s ability to reaffirm significant Clausewitzian principles was due to the fact that ‘they had similar methods of thinking and theorising.’ Mao also critiqued the Soviet rejection of Clausewitz as one of ‘the weaknesses of Stalinist dialectics.’ After Mao, Giap became an ardent disciple of Clausewitz in his theorisation of anti-colonial guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. Like Mao, he was not a mechanical disciple, but a revolutionary who read Clausewitz thoroughly while he ‘applied or reinvented Clausewitzian doctrine in the specific light of revolutionary warfare’.

[Harsh Thakor is a freelance journalist]

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Frontier
Vol 58, No. 13, Sep 21 - 27, 2025